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Abstract
We are currently facing a highly critical case of a world-wide pandemic. The novel
coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2, a.k.a. COVID-19) has proved to be extremely contagious
and the original outbreak from Asia has now spread to all continents. This situation
will fruitfully profit from the study in regards of the spread of the virus, assessing
effective countermeasures to weight the impact of the adopted strategies. The stan-
dard Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model is a very successful and widely used
mathematical model for predicting the spread of an epidemic. We adopt the SIR model
on a random network and extend the model to include control strategies lockdown and
testing – two often employed mitigation strategies. The ability of these strategies in
controlling the pandemic spread is investigated by varying the effectiveness with which
they are implemented. The possibility of a second outbreak is evaluated in detail after
the mitigation strategies are withdrawn. We notice that, in any case, a sudden interrup-
tion of such mitigation strategies will likely induce a resurgence of a second outbreak,
whose peak will be correlated to the number of susceptible individuals. In fact, we find
that a population will remain vulnerable to the infection until the herd immunity is
achieved. We also test our model with real statistics and information on the epidemic
spread in South Korea, Germany, and New York and find a remarkable agreement with
the simulation data.
1 Introduction
In the recent outbreak of the highly contagious novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2 a.k.a COVID-
19), which emerged out of the city of Wuhan, the infection has spread mainly through people-
to-people contacts. Consequently, the policies have relied on limiting the contacts by closing
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down schools, banning mass gatherings, and encouraging individuals to maintain sufficient
distance from others while in the public spaces, and mandating mask-wearing. These mitiga-
tion measures help to slowdown the spread, but to achieve sufficient control over it lockdowns
have been imposed by many countries, whereby people are restricted to their homes and the
outside movements are restricted to meet only the most necessary needs. The ideal scenario
of a complete lockdown is practically impossible to achieve, as people go out to buy food
and medical supplies. As a result, there is a finite probability with which people follow the
lockdown, and the value of one represents the ideal case of complete lockdown.
Another controlling strategy is testing, where the infection can be identified and isolated
through testing. The testing measure has been employed effectively by South Korea to
contain the spread of coronavirus without imposing severe social distancing measures used
by other countries. The interventions such as the closure of schools and workplaces, banning
mass gatherings, mandated mask-wearing can further aide the testing measure.
The uncontrolled spread of coronavirus can lead to a large portion of the population
becoming sick over a span of few days, many of whom will need medical attention at a
hospital, and some might succumb to the decease without proper medical care. It is a fact
that most hospitals would not be able to handle such large numbers of patients, as they can
normally provide care to only a few patients per ten thousand of the population. Therefore,
to curb the burden on the health care system and to reduce the mortality rate, making it
possible for each individual to receive the needed medical assistance [1, 2, 3, 4], mitigating
interventions are required. The lockdown and testing strategies are successful at controlling
the spread, and knowing how infection spreads in the system when these strategies are
employed would allow us to make proper usage of our resources and to plan to meet the
future needs better. Equally important is to know what happens when the controls are
lifted, allowing the population to function normally. The lockdown and testing strategies
essentially operate by reducing the effective reproduction number, Re, and a value smaller
than one indicates a decline in the number of cases [5, 6, 7]. However, the actual reproduction
number R0 of the uncontrolled system remains the same. Hence, any decrease in effective
reproduction number does not provide the assurance of eliminating the epidemic in this
well connected world. Many studies have come up since February 2020 on predicting the
growth of the epidemic using mathematical modeling [8, 9], as well as numerical simulations
with particles and networks [1]. Further, extensive studies on the effect of social distancing
interventions have also been done [10, 4, 8, 11]. Nevertheless, incorporating the various
other mitigation strategies in the predictive models in a realistic manner is still not well
understood, and further studies are required.
For such studies, it is well known that stochastic modeling of the epidemic outbreak can
be performed using a network of contacts of individuals. A network provides an intuitive
way to model the spread of an epidemic described by a graph, where each vertex represents
an individual, and the infection spreads from one individual to another through contacts
represented by edges [12, 7]. Designing a suitable network is an essential aspect of the
problem and can have a significant impact on the prediction. A variety of network designs
with distinct features are available. Among them, random and small-world networks are
often used in epidemiological modeling. A small-world network is capable of modeling long-
and short-range connections and displays a significant effect on the spread of infection to
reach all parts of the world quickly [13, 14, 15]. Some studies concerning COVID-19 show
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the containment in the spread of the disease by weakening or disconnecting these long-range
links [10, 11]. A more local approach can be employed for modeling regions that employ
travel restrictions, severing large-range connections, and ban large gatherings of people,
limiting the number of local contacts per-person. Hence, we believe that for understanding
the dynamics of an epidemic in such mitigated conditions, the Erdös-Rényi random network
is an appropriate choice [16]. In this network, each vertex is connected randomly with
other vertices with a constant probability, and the probability distribution of the edges is
Poissonian [16].
The main goal of this study is to predict the growth of the epidemic with the lockdown and
the testing strategies and investigate their impact on the second outbreak through numerical
simulations. Although the system is assumed to be closed, the influence of the outside world
on the final state of the system is also considered by adding external infections. We have
shown detailed numerical simulations on a million population to mimic the growth of COVID-
19 in South Korea, Germany and New York. These studies on real data uses the approach
which includes both lockdown and testing measures in the simulations. Interestingly and
importantly, we have performed the numerical simulation by tuning only two-parameters
(reflecting the extent of lockdown and the effectiveness of testing) to achieve the desire results.
Such studies are helpful to identify effective countermeasures and to weight the impact of
the adopted strategies and also make us understand the limitations of the modeling.
The paper is organized as follows. The modeling approach and the comparison with
the three state compartmental model for an uncontrolled growth is presented in section 2.
Sec.3 contains the epidemic modeling with different mitigation strategies and, further, the
impacts of the lockdown and the testing strategies on the epidemic dynamics are investigated
in subsections 3.2 and 3.1, respectively. In Sec.4, our modeling of the epidemic growth is
compared with statistics of the epidemic diffusion in South Korea, Germany and New York.
The results are finally discussed in Sec. 5.
2 Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model
The susceptible-infectious-recovered (SIR) model is one of the widely used standard mathe-
matical models for predicting the epidemic growth. The model is suitable for those infections
in which recovered individuals develop a long term immunity and are unlikely to get infected
the second time, as the infection spreads. In this model, the population is compartmental-
ized into the groups of susceptible (S), infectious (I), and recovered (R), and their evolution
is given by [6, 7]
dS
dt
= −αIS
N
,
dI
dt
= α
IS
N
− γI,
dR
dt
= γI, (1)
where the constants α and γ are related to the transmission of the infection and the recovery
of the infected, respectively, in a population of size S + I + R = N . In the above system,
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each individual interacts with all the other members of the population with small but equal
probability, and the infection spreads through the contacts at an average rate of τ . Thus,
for a system (e.g. a random network) with a finite number of nˆ mean contacts per unit time,
we get α = τ nˆ.
The model exhibits a peak in the evolution of the infectious, occurring when dI/dt = 0
and R0 ≡ α/γ = 1/S˜, where S˜ = S/N . Subsequently, dI/dt becomes negative, and the
number of infectious continues to decrease. The spread stops after dI/dt becomes zero. By
this time, every individual in the population may not become infected; this situation is often
described as the herd immunity. The total number of cases for reaching the herd immunity
is dependent on R0 – the higher the value of R0, the higher is the number of total infected
in the population before the herd immunity is attained.
The standard SIR model represents an ideal system where each individual interacts with
all other individuals, a so-called well mixed system. In a real system, however, an individual
can have only a finite number of contacts. The interaction between any two individuals can
also depend on many other factors such as distance, age group, and profession [1, 17], etc.
Including these details in the SIR model is not straight forward; however, many of the issues
can be addressed easily through network modeling, which allows flexibility in manipulating
the contacts. Exploiting this flexibility, we aim to implement SIR dynamics on a network
and enable the inclusion of lockdown and testing control strategies.
For simulating the SIR dynamics on a network, one needs to set the parameters α and
γ appropriately. These parameters are selected utilizing the available data for the spread of
COVID-19. Considering the mean recovery period of approximately 14 days, γ = 1/14 day−1
is assigned. The value of α is calculated from R0 reported in the literature. For COVID-19,
R0 = (5.5 − 3.26). In many of the results concerning mitigation strategies presented here,
R0 = 3.53 is chosen, and the corresponding value of α = 0.25 day−1. The network is marched
in time following Gillespie algorithm [18].
In Fig. 1, we compare the results obtained for the 105 populations from the continuous
SIR model and those from the random network model with 20 mean connection for the same
parameters. The SIR model shows a steep increase in the number of infectious, peaking at
35% of the total population, around 75th days after the exposer. Thereafter, the number
of infectious decreases and drops to zero beyond 175 days and the population attains herd
immunity with 98% becoming infected. As noted earlier, the percentage of the total infected
(recovered) at the end depends strongly on R0, which corresponds to the rate of the infection
spread, α. The results from the random network model is qualitatively similar, but some
differences can be noticed. First, the infectious curve reaches the peak value a few days later
with slightly lower number of infected, at 30% of the population. Second, the heard immunity
is reached after 95% of the population becomes infected, which is slightly lower compared
to the SIR model. Overall, the predictions from the two models are in good agreement.
Using the same parameters, in the section below, we explore the effect of mitigation
measures on the spread of the pandemic and try to explore the best strategy for its control.
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Figure 1: The time evolution of I and R predicted from a network simulation of SIR dynamics
as well as that obtained by integrating the continuous SIR model. The curves for random
network are averaged over 100 different realizations. The parameters used are γ = 1/14,
α = 0.25 with I(0) = 5 for a population of size 0.1 million.
3 Results
In this section, we discuss how the effect of the lockdown and the testing can be including
in the SIR random network model and investigate the epidemic dynamics in the mitigated
system.
3.1 Lockdown
A simple and effective mitigation strategy is to impose lockdown. This approach relies on
limiting the contacts between any two individuals, which ultimately leads to a reduction the
rate of infection growth. In the ideal case of complete lockdown, all contacts are disrupted,
resulting a decline in the number of the infectious as they recover. In a network, the ef-
fect of lockdown can be modeled by isolating the nodes. Effectively, an infectious node is
also isolated by making the probability of infection transmission to zero through all edges
connected to the node. In a realistic system implementing lockdown can also involve many
other complexities. For example, all individuals do not go into lockdown immediately; there
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is a time window over which this happens. Further, all individuals do not remain isolated
at the same, and there is a fraction that remains mobile and can still spread the infection.
There is another issue of close contacts, such as those between the members of a family living
together. These contacts never break, and the presence of an infectious can affect the other
members as well. These details can have significant impact on the outcome, but for simplic-
ity we ignore such complications and study the situation in which contacts are immediately
cut-off and a randomly picked individuals become isolated. However, we have considered the
scenario in which a fraction of the population is mobile even after the lockdown is in place
due random picking update in simulation.
The impact of lockdown on the spread of infection is examined in Fig. 2. In the real
world, the lockdown cannot be continued indefinitely, since social interactions are important
for economic transactions as well as for the well-being of individuals. Therefore, a lockdown
period of 60 days is considered. There is always a risk of the second outbreak in the popu-
lation after the lockdown is lifted, depending on the number density of the susceptible. The
state of the system at this time is, therefore, important for understanding the further the
spread and the final configuration attained by the system. The end state of the lockdown
is strongly dependent on the time when this measure is introduced during the uncontrolled
epidemic growth. In general, an early imposition will result a higher density of the suscep-
tible who can get infected than a late imposition. Consequently, we examine two different
scenarios by imposing the lockdown at two different times after an uncontrolled spread of the
infection. In the first scenario (LD5P), the lockdown was imposed when the number density
of the infected reached 5% of the total population, whereas, in the second scenario (LD10P),
it was imposed when the number density was 10%. An ideal implementation of the lockdown
in which all individuals become isolated is difficult to achieve in the real population. For
this reason, the cases studied here also consider the scenarios in which the fraction of the
population in isolation varies.
We first consider the LD5P cases. The lockdown is introduced at t ≈ 35 days when
the density of the infected reached about 5% of the population, and maintained for another
60 days. Here, we investigate the spread of the infection during and after the lockdown
(Figs. 2a and 2b). In the case with 100% lockdown, in which everyone in the population
isolates himself/herself, the density of the infectious stops growing immediately after the
lockdown is imposed. Subsequently, it decreases with time as the infected nodes recover.
After the 60th day when the lockdown is withdrawn, the infectious start growing once again
and attain a second peak because of the second outbreak. It is well known from earlier studies
that a longer duration of the lockdown lowers the number of infectious [1, 2, 11, 8], while
the susceptible density remains almost the same; a sufficiently long lockdown can completely
eradicate the infections in the system. Nevertheless, the system remains susceptible to a
second outbreak if the susceptible are large in number. For a closed system completely
eradicating the infectious is desirable; however, for systems in which the outside interactions
are present, further mitigation efforts might be needed to keep the spread in check, as a
small number of infectious coming in from the outside can lead to another outbreak. The
severity of the second outbreak in such a system is investigated in detail below.
The response of the system in partial lockdowns with probabilities 25%, 50% and 75% is
also examined in Figs. 2a and 2b. The overall behavior of the system in a partial lockdown
varies from the uncontrolled response to that exhibited by the system in complete lockdown,
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Figure 2: The evolution of active cases (left panels) and total cases (right panels) in the
population when the spread is mitigated through partial and complete lockdowns. Differ-
ent studies are performed by introducing lockdowns at different stages of an uncontrolled
simulation – I(t) = 0.05 (top panels) and I(t) = 0.1 (bottom panels). The lockdowns are
maintained for the duration of 60-days, and the impact on the second outbreak is also ex-
plored after the lockdown is lifted. The shaded region show the standard deviation of the
data form its mean value represented by lines.
depending on the probability of the implementation. For lockdown with 25% probability,
the number of active cases evolves similar to that with the uncontrolled simulation (Fig. 2a).
There is no second outbreak, but the peak value of the active cases is slightly lower at
approx 17% of the total population compared to the uncontrolled case. Moreover, as shown
in Fig. 2b, the total cases saturates at 78% of the total population, as compared to 95% for
the uncontrolled simulation. The lockdown with 75% probability, on the other hand, is closer
to the complete lockdown case. After the lockdown is imposed, the active cases increases
slightly before they start to fall, and there is a second peak after the lockdown is removed.
The second peak forms at 20% of the total population, a slightly smaller value compared
to the complete lockdown case, in which the peak forms at 25% of the total population.
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The reason is that more people get infected during the lockdown with 75% probability, and
the number of susceptible is therefore relatively lower when it is lifted. Considering the
smaller second peak, the lockdown with 75% probability is more desirable than the complete
lockdown, if there is a second outbreak in the system. The saturation of the total cases with
75% probability is close to that with the complete lockdown (Fig. 2b). The case with 50%
lockdown is the most interesting. In this case, two peaks of comparable strength develop for
the active cases at about 10% of the total population, and the total cases saturate at a value
comparable to the case with 25% probability.
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Figure 3: Possibilities of second outbreak by introducing additional infectious at reopening
after 300 days of complete lockdown for 105 number of nodes with 20 mean connections. The
reproduction number Ro = 3.26 and recovery period of 14 days are used in the simulations
and each curve is obtained after 100 different realizations. The shaded regions show the
standard error of the data form its mean value represented by lines.
It is crucial to notice that the second wave is proportional to the seriousness of the
lockdown: the more effective the lockdown, the higher is the second peak since the number
of susceptible increases at the end of the lockdown period. In the case with 25% probability,
the second peak is not observed because a large part of the population becomes infected by
the time lockdown is lifted. The plot of the total cases generally shows three regimes: the
first corresponding to the unmitigated growth, the second corresponding to lockdown, and
the final corresponding to a converged configuration with herd immunity. When there is
a second outbreak, there is an additional regime corresponding to the outbreak before the
system transitions to the final configuration regime.
Next, we consider the LD10P cases shown in Figs.2c and 2d. The dynamics observed for
these cases with complete and partial lockdowns imposed for 60-days are similar to those
observed for LD5P cases. Some differences arise due to the larger number of the infectious
at the start of the lockdown, resulting in a lower number of susceptible at the end of it. As
a consequence, the peak in active cases curve during the second outbreak forms at slightly
lower values, as compared to the LD5P cases. For example, in 50% lockdown, the first peak
occurs at 10% of the population, but the second peak occurs at 5% of the population, and
the total cases saturates at 80% of the population.
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From above results it is clear that lockdowns implemented with high probabilities can
reduce the number of infectious during the time the measure is in place. Therefore, it is
possible to get rid of the infection completely by imposing the lockdown over a sufficiently
long time period. However, depending on the number density of the susceptible, the system
remains at the risk of a second out break, after the lockdown is lifted and new infections are
brought into the system from outside. It is likely that the system develops some resistance
towards the second outbreak, since there are some recovered among the susceptible and
starting the outbreak might require a large number of new infectious in the system. In
Fig. 3, we investigate the relationship between the second outbreak and the number of new
infectious in the system after complete lockdown is maintained for over 300 days. For this
investigation, the LD5P case is considered, and the second outbreak is studied by introducing
different numbers of infected (0 ,10 and 100) at the end of the lockdown. Trivially, if no new
infection is introduced into the system after the lockdown is lifted, the infection does not
grow. This means that all the infectious in the system recover during the long lockdown.
However, a second peak develops with 10 and 100 new infections are added in the system.
As shown in Fig. 3a, the active cases start increasing in both scenarios, but the growth is
somewhat faster with 100 new infections than 10. The total cases saturates to about the
same value (90% of the population), close to the value observed in the uncontrolled spread.
Thus it is important to note that the effect of outside influences, although ignored in the
closed systems, is important considered for the connected populations in the real world. At
this point, we would like to emphasize that we can easily predict the second peak by equating
the difference in the integral of the active cases after the lockdown with the total cases of
the uncontrolled curve.
3.2 Testing
Testing is another effective strategy for handling the pandemic. This relies on our ability
to identify the infectious in the population; once identified, they are isolated to stop the
further spread. The mitigation through testing can be made more effective by tracing the
source of the infection and the contacts of the infected. Without focusing on the details of
how the infected are being identified, we assume to have a testing mechanism in place that
identifies a fraction of the newly infected, defined as the effectiveness of testing, P(T ). In
the random network, the effect of testing is captured by randomly selecting an infected node
with a probability determined by the effectiveness of the testing, and then isolating the node
by blocking any further transmission through contacts. We have also included a time delay,
Tin, after which the infected nodes become available for testing. The time delay takes into
account the incubation time of the infection. However, during this time an infected node
continues to spread the infection. In this study, Tin = 2day is used, corresponding to the
incubation time of COVID-19. The time evolution of the active and the total cases in the
population with testing measures of varying effectiveness are shown in Fig. 4. Similar to the
study of lockdown, two scenarios are considered that differ form each other in terms of the
start of testing. Cases TS5P correspond to those simulations in which testing is started after
the infectious reached 5% of the total population, whereas cases TS10P correspond to those
in which testing is started at 10% of the infected density in the population.
First, we consider the TS5P cases (Fig. 4a and 4b). Figure 4a depicts the effect of testing
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Figure 4: The evolution of the active cases I(t) (left panels) and the total cases I(t) +R(t)
(right panels) in the population when the spread of infection is controlled through testing
of varying effectiveness. Two different studies are performed employing testing measures
when density of I(t) = 0.05 and 0.1. For comparison, the active and the total cases from
the uncontrolled simulation are also plotted with solid lines. The shaded regions show the
standard deviation of the data form its mean value represented by lines
of varying effectiveness (P(T )) on the active cases. It can be observed from the figure that
testing is capable of suppressing the peak value, and it becomes more efficient with higher
effectiveness. Notice that with effectiveness of 75%, the peak in the active cases is only
slightly higher than 0.05. Even with effectiveness of 50%, the testing can reduce the number
of active cases at the peak by 2/3 compared to the value attained in the uncontrolled system.
An examination of the total cases in Fig. 4b shows smaller saturation values compared to
the uncontrolled simulation, depending on the effectiveness of testing. For example, with
effectiveness of 75%, the total cases asymptote to a value close to 0.2, i.e., only 20% of the
population get infected at the end. Even in the worst testing measure with 25% effectiveness,
the total cases saturate to a much lower value of 50% than the uncontrolled simulation with
90% infected. It is worth noting that with the value of R0 chosen for the study, the heard
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immunity in an uncontrolled growth is achieved after 90 − 95% of the population become
infected. Thus, there is a possibility of a second wave if the testing is stopped and if there is
an influx of new infection into the system. This aspect of the problem is further investigated
in Fig. 5.
The results obtained from TS10P simulations are shown in Figs. 4c and 4d. The resem-
blance between the results from TS10P simulations and those from TS5P simulations are
striking. However, small differences can be identified, arising mainly due to different config-
urations at the time testing was introduced. In TS10P cases, testing started when the active
cases and the recovered were larger compared to that in TS5P cases. The longtime conver-
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Figure 5: The evolution of the active cases I(t) (left panels) and the total cases (right
panels) in the population when the spread of infection is controlled through testing with
effectiveness,P(T) of 50%. Two different studies are performed: the upper panels when
testing is stopped at 110th day and 10 and 100 new infectious are introduced to capture the
external influences, and the lower panel when testing is continued at all times and 10, 100
and 1000 new infectious are introduced at 110th day. The parameters used for the simulation
are N = 105, α = 0.25, α = 1/14 and averaged over 500 different realizations. The shaded
regions show the standard deviation of the data form its mean value represented by lines.
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gence of the total cases to lower values in different TS5P and TS10P simulations compared
to the uncontrolled simulation suggests smaller effective Re for the system with testing. The
dynamics are likely to revert back to that of the uncontrolled system without testing, ad-
justing Re to higher values. This suggests a second outbreak in the system, especially when
there is a high influx of infection from the outside. This scenario is further investigated in
Fig. 5, where the evolution of the active and the total cases are plotted in the late-time
configuration of the TSP5 case with 50% effective testing. In this simulation, we infect some
susceptible in different realizations when the active cases becomes 100 (close to 100th day
of the spread) after the peak. As with the system under lockdown, the second outbreak is
studied by changing the number of infectious, marking the beginning of the second outbreak.
The peak in the active cases curve increases as the number of new infectious increases from
0 to 10 when testing is stopped, as shown in Fig. 5a, and further saturates at the same level
with any increase in the new infectious. Examining the total cases curves in Fig 5b reveals
that with 10 and 100 new infections, total recovered asymptotes to a value close to 90% of
the total population, similar to what was achieve in the uncontrolled system. Thus, it is im-
portant to note that the system is vulnerable to new infections and, therefore, the mitigation
should be continued to stopped the second out break. The effect on the continued testing
scenario on the added infections (100, 500 and 1000) has also been explored in Figs. 5c and
5d. It can be seen from the figures that with continues testing, the added infection does not
result into a prominant second outbreak, and the infection quickly gets suppressed, while the
total cases increase marginally. Even adding 1000 infections, the testing with P(T ) = 50%
works well to keep the second peak in control.
4 Analysis of COVID-19 Statistics of South Korea, Ger-
many and New York
In earlier sections, we have discussed how the lockdown and testing strategies can be im-
plemented using a random network, simulating the SIR dynamics. Utilizing the developed
models, the dynamics of pandemic growth is studied by varying the probability of implement-
ing lockdown and changing the effectiveness of testing. However, the predictive capabilities
of the model in capturing the growth of an epidemic in the real population is not clear,
as the model tries to incorporate only the most essential features of the real system while
ignoring many of inherent complexities such as heterogeneity in the population density, non-
uniformity in contacts, and other spatio-temporal variabilities. Here, we demonstrated that
the model, although simple, can be tuned to imitate the behavior of a real system. We
demonstrated the applicability by simulating the spread of COVID-19 in three different re-
gions: South Korea, Germany and New York and show that the epidemic growth predicted
by our model agrees with the real data. With this study we also realize how to fine-tune and
robust the model parameters are to achieve a trend of the infection growth in realistic model.
This comparison also help us understand the implications and needs of the lockdown and
testing in realistic systems to bring the spread of the epidemic under control and maintaining
the infectious to a low level.
The random network used in these studies employs one million nodes. Although the
number of individuals in the countries studied here can be up to 90 times larger, with one
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million node the network provides a good representation of the population as the number of
cases are relatively small, only few hundred thousand. The average number of connection per
node is 40, which is reasonable considering the restrictions on travel and mass gatherings
in these countries. We have also used 20 mean connections per node, and similar results
were obtained after modifying α by a small magnitude. The average connectivity between
the nodes has an effect on the transmission rate is well know for discrete systems and this
characteristics sets them apart from the continuous SIR model [15]. In all the three countries,
we choose the effective infection rate between 0.4 − 0.35. The α values are obtained by
fitting the SIR predictions of the active cases with the real data during the early phases of
the spread. Considering the recovery rate of γ = 1/14 day−1, corresponding to the mean
recovery time of 14 days for COVID-19, the reproduction number of these simulations are
Ro = 4.9 − 5.6. For these Ro values, the mean-field system achieves herd immunity after
the infection spread to almost the entire population. In a real system, however, the herd
immunity will be achieved at a smaller fraction since the mean-field always overestimates
the number of total cases. We implement both lockdown and testing in these studies. The
lockdown is implemented corresponding to the date when stay at home order was released
by the states/countries. The testing period is approximated by observing the trend of the
active cases and using information announced in the news broadcast. Further, we have tuned
the parameters of the lockdown probability and the testing effectiveness to best capture the
trend in the epidemic growth.
4.1 South Korea
Earlier studies have estimated the intrinsic growth rate of COVID-19 in South Korea (SK)
as α = 0.6 day−1 [19]. However, we have calculated α by fitting the data of the active cases
with the SIR prediction for the first ten days and using recovery rate γ = 1/14 day−1. The
value obtained by best fit for simulation started with ten initial infection (I(0) = 10) is
α ≈ 0.4. The recovery rate can also be approximated from data by calculating the time
when the total cases and the active cases start deviating, which is around 16th days from
the day data is provided in Worldometer. We start the simulation at the time when the
number of infectious in the population is 10, i.e., I(0) = 10−5.
We simulated our modified model that contains testing as well as lockdown (Social dis-
tancing) strategies, as explained in Sec. 3.2 and 3.1 and compare the results with SK statis-
tics. We start the simulation without any mitigation, and implement partial lockdown with
a small probability of 15% on 23rd February, when the number of active cases is I(t) = 600.
Later, testing with effectiveness value of 65% is started on 2th of March, when the drive
through testing began in SK with the number of infected reaching 4300. The lockdown
probability and the testing effectiveness are chosen to capture the trend in active cases accu-
rately. As shown in Fig. 6c, the simulated curve for the active cases compares well with the
real data and is within the standard deviation. However, there is a small deviation between
the two curves during the period when the total cases show a linear regime, resulting from
a rather sharp change in the slope of the active cases from mid-March to early April. This
trend has been difficult to capture in our simulation. This sharp change is of 30-days long
and can be an artifact of a more effective implementation of the mitigation strategies, pos-
sibly with time-dependent variations. During this period, the number of infections per day
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Figure 6: Comparison plot of South Korea COVID-19 epidemic data with our simulation
results obtained from SIR model over a random graph. In Fig. 6a, the linear trend in the
total cases is the time after drive through testing started by South Korea. The data compared
here is from 15th February 2020. The random graph used have one million nodes with 40
mean edges and averaged over 100 different realizations. The other parameters α = 0.4,
γ = 1/14 are used. The shaded regions represent the standard deviation with its mean value
denoted by lines.
is low, at around 100 infection per day, which can be seen in the daily cases in Fig. 6b [20].
We also note that the present study does not take into account the asymptomatic cases who
spread the infection, but are underrepresented in the data, and this can also cause serious
problems in capturing the trend of the real system.
We try to improve the prediction of the model described (scheme 1) during the linear
regime of the total cases by changing the testing effectiveness to 70% (scheme 2); thus
illustrating the model sensitivity to this parameter. With this value of testing effectiveness,
the linear regime is well represented, but the late time behavior under-represents the active
cases (not shown). In order to rectify this problem, the effectiveness parameter is changed
again to 60% after 30-days. In scheme 2, we are able to obtain a linear regime in the total
14
cases, but its start is delayed to 40th-day, as compared to 20th-day in the real data (Fig. 6d).
Moreover, the total cases curve rises as much as twice the magnitude of the real data.
Finally, we note that a large number of individuals in the population remains susceptible
to a second outbreak. Therefore, continuing testing with same effectiveness will be desirable
for avoiding the second wave.
4.2 Germany
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Figure 7: Comparison plot of Germany COVID-19 epidemic data with our simulation results
obtained from SIR model over a random graph. The data compared here is from 15th
February 2020. The random graph used have one million nodes with 40 mean edges and
averaged over 50 different realizations. The parameters α = 0.4, γ = 1/14 are used. The
shaded regions represent the standard deviation with the mean values denoted by lines.
Germany adopted different strategies compared to South Korea for controlling the spread.
Where South Korea control relied on effective testing, Germany had a serious lockdown in the
initial stages, not allowing even two people to stay together in the public spaces. In the later
stage Germany adopted testing and contact tracing with high effectiveness, before opening
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the state by relaxing the lockdown measures. According to the available news sources, the
serious lockdown was implemented on March, 22nd, when the number of infectious was
approximately 24, 500. In the simulation, lockdown with 85% probability was implemented
for a period of 55 days, starting from day 36. After a week, testing with the effectiveness of
25% was also introduced, when the infectious population was approximately 60000; at this
time a small change in the dynamics can be observed in the active and the total cases. Note
that the testing effectiveness of the real system may be slightly different due to presence of
asymptomatic infectious which are not fully captured in the real data. Before opening, we
have employed testing with varying effectiveness, as shown in Fig. 7. If the system continue
with testing with effectiveness of 25%, the model predicts a resurgence of second peak. Thus
more efficient testing is needed for controlling the resurgence of the disease as can be seen in
Fig. 7c. We find that the effectiveness of 50% represents the real data well. The number of
active cases obtained from the simulation follows the real data remarkably well. We also get
a good agreement for the number of daily cases, as one can see in Fig. 7b. However, the total
cases is higher in our simulation and can be attributed to the limitations inherent in the model
for representing the real system, as well as a lack of sufficient information for implementing
the mitigation strategies. Some discrepancies may arise due to under representation of the
asymptomatic infectious in the real data.
4.3 New York
New York is one of the highly populated states in the United States of America, with a total
population of approx 19.4 millions. Due to being a densely populated and highly connected
with the outside world, New York has the highest number of COVID-19 cases. It is one
of the most challenging data to reproduce due to the limited information we can get from
IHME website [21]. According to IHME, New York restricted all big gatherings by 18th of
March and stayed at home order was passed on 22nd of March. By 22nd of March, the count
of the active cases in New York was approximately 15, 000. Further, we do not have any
proper knowledge when the testing was implemented in the system and what is its efficiency.
Similar to the other two countries, we start with choosing an infection rate such that the
first ten days of available data matched for fixed recovery rate, γ = 1/14 days−1. In our
model, the unmitigated infection rate of New York, α = 0.4, turns out to be the same as for
South Korea with 10 initial infections. We then implemented the partial lockdown with a
probability of 63% when the number of infections is 15, 000. Later, in our model, we assumed
that the testing was started by early April when the active cases are approximately 100, 000
and we implemented testing with the effectiveness of 25% to capture the real data curves.
We have implemented lockdown for 80 days and after opening we study two cases; one where
testing continue with 25%, and another the increase to 75%. Our study suggest that opening
with efficient testing facilities will control the second outbreak as shown in Fig. 8c. It is also
important to note that the two different strategies 4.1 and 4.3 of the same system lead to
very different growth behavior. We observe discrepancies in case total cases Fig. 8d as well
as in daily cases Fig. 8b, results. These differences may be due to the Poisson distributed
connections of the random graph, which limits the spread of the infections to such immense
value with strong mitigation measures. We also observe that the daily cases number in
simulation Fig. 8b are almost double and continue to be large values for an extended period.
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Figure 8: Comparison plot of New York COVID-19 epidemic data with our simulation results
obtained from SIR model over a random graph. The data compared here is from 12th March
2020. The random graph used have one million nodes with 40 mean edges and averaged over
10 different realizations. The other parameters α = 0.4, γ = 1/14 are used. The shaded
region represent the standard deviation with its mean value denoted by lines.
It might be due to differences in the fixed recovery period we have chosen.
5 Discussions and Conclusions
In this study, a network model is utilized for studying the dynamics of infection spreading
through a population. Here, we have used a random graph that solves the SIR model using
parameters relevant for COVID-19. Furthermore, the SIR random network model has been
extended to include the effect of mitigation strategies lockdown and testing. The network
model including lockdown/test measure is then used to investigate the dynamics of epidemic
growth in the mitigated system. In addition, using the developed models, we carry out
three studies concerning the spread of infection in real systems (South Korea, Germany and
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New York) which utilize lockdown and testing measures for controlling the spread. We show
that the network model including lockdown and testing measure preforms reasonably well in
predicting the spread of COVID-19 in the real system studies.
The lockdown measure is implemented by forcing the nodes to get isolated with a pre-
specified probability; with probability one, the system is considered to be complete lockdown
where the randomly picked nodes definitely isolated themself. The study of epidemic growth
in a system under lockdown reveals a large peak in the number of infectious, similar to the
uncontrolled dynamics, if the probability of the lockdown implementation is low (e.g. 25%).
For implementations with large probabilities (e.g., 75% or larger), the number of infected at
the peak can become as large as that of an uncontrolled system if the lockdown is lifted and
there is a second outbreak. The lockdown implementation with 50% presents an optimal
scenario in which there is a second outbreak and two peaks of equal amplitudes develop.
However, at about 10% of the population, the number of infected at the peaks can still be
quite large. We also show that there is a second outbreak after the lockdown is withdrawn,
which depends on the number of infected at the end of the lockdown period. If the number
of susceptible is considerably larger than the herd immunity value then the system remain at
the risk of the second outbreak, especially when the system can be reinfected due to outside
interaction.
The testing measure relies on the ability to identify the infectious as well as the asymp-
tomatic in the population. The implementation depends on the finding of the contagious
nodes with the effectiveness of testing and completely isolating them. We find that testing
with effectiveness greater than 50% works reasonable well for controlling the spread, and the
peak in the infectious curve forms only at a slightly higher value than the level at which the
measure is introduced. Beyond the peak value, the infectious curve starts dropping and if
the mitigation is maintained long enough, the infection can be completely eradicated from
the system. However, as we observed in case of lockdown, the system under testing remains
at the risk of the second outbreak if a large number of susceptible exist in the population,
especially when there is an outside interaction and any further testing is stopped.
Although both lockdown and testing rely on modifying the interaction between two in-
dividuals, it is essential to understand the underlying differences. For implementing the
lockdown, no prior knowledge of the infected is required and all individuals are isolated, re-
gardless of their status – susceptible, infectious or recovered. Thus, the mitigation measure
can be implemented easily and quickly without deploying large resources. For testing to be
effective, one needs to establish facilities that can identify enough number of infected among
a pool of potential spreader of the infection. Therefore, considerable effort and resources are
required for implementing testing.
Furthermore, testing is likely to perform better than lockdown in terms of compliance
from the members of the population. In lockdown, all individuals are treated exactly the
same, and regardless of their status as infectious, susceptible or recovered are kept in isola-
tion. For this reason, the mitigation measure is likely to suffers from the lack of compliance
by the members of the population, especially when the implementation drags for a long time
period. Testing, on the other hand, identifies and isolates the infected and those who are
likely to catch the infection. Thus, only the potential spreads are affected, which makes the
population’s compliance possible to a large extent. Also, with testing the adverse effect on
the economy and social lives of the people can be managed better.
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Finally, we note that eliminating an infection as contagious as COVID-19 is difficult,
primarily because the world populations are highly connected. Any remnant of the infec-
tions anywhere in the world has the potential to reignite the spread if the population has
not acquire the herd immunity. Therefore, the goal is to reach the herd immunity, either
through a vaccine or through the spread, preferably controlled. In the latter case, one needs
to control the spread to a level that the increase in the infectious can be handled effectively
by the local health-care facilities; at the same time, the number of the recovered is allowed
to increase, ultimately attaining the herd immunity. Hence, the mixed strategies including
both lockdown and testing will be useful in near-future. Various countries have used this ap-
proach; however, they differ in the many aspects such as the time to initiate the mitigations,
lockdown period, the effectiveness of testing, etc. We have made the numerical comparison
of a mixed mitigation scheme on the three very different state, all with very different miti-
gation strategies. Interestingly, with a very simplified model, we are able to reproduce the
growth of the epidemic of these countries. Our study suggest that the resurgence in South
Korea and Germany is controlled due to high efficient testing after opening and so New York
should follow the same. At this time, most of the countries are opening, and there might
be a resurgence of the epidemic (also seen in Germany simulation when we decrease the
testing efficiency). These comparative studies over real data give us a rough estimate of the
combined effect of lockdown and testing. Thus similar studies using realistic models will be
useful to gain insights of the epidemic spread.
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